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EuropEAn poLICy ovErhAuL 
– A SECtorAL ASSESSMEnt
A cikk az Európai Unió legfontosabbnak ítélt kihívásait értékeli. Amellett, hogy ismerteti 
az egyes vizsgálati területeken az utóbbi néhány év legfontosabb reformlépéseit, a további 
teendőkre, azok realitásának, illetve hatásainak elemzésére helyezi a hangsúlyt.
A cikk két részre oszlik. Az első rész az EU kiemelt belső politikáit és jellemzőit értékeli, a 
második a világban elfoglalt helye szempontjából fontos szakterületeket. 
Az első rész az alábbi szakterületeket veszi vizsgálat alá:
– Euróválság, válságkezelés, makrogazdasági és pénzpiaci reformok.
– Az EU költségvetésének reformja annak érdekében, hogy az jobban illeszkedjen a 21. szá-
zadi realitásokhoz és az állampolgári elvárásokhoz.
– A regionális politika és a közös agrárpolitika reformja.
– Energiapolitika és energiaunió.
– A mélyreható reformokhoz elengedhetetlen európai identitás, illetve annak hiányának ér-
tékelése és kilátásainak vizsgálata.
A második rész az alábbi területekkel foglalkozik:
– Az európai hadsereg kérdése és védelempolitika.
– Az európai közös kül- és biztonságpolitika.
– Bevándorláspolitika.
Az egyes részeket a terület elsőrangú szakértői írták meg, akiknek közös meggyőződése, 
hogy a fenti szakterületeken van nemcsak lehetőség, de szükség is az előrelépésre annak 
érdekében, hogy az európai projekt sikeres maradhasson. Ennek a szerzők szerint két mini-
mumfeltétele van: egyrészt meg kell őriznie nemzetközi relevanciáját mind gazdasági, mind 
geopolitikai szempontból, másrészt közelebb kell kerülnie az európai állampolgárok elvárá-
saihoz. Az ezt elősegítő legfontosabb reformelképzeléseket ismertetik, illetve saját elkép-
zelésekkel is kiegészítik egy közös cikkben.
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The European Union has a remarkably charged political agenda having to face a turbulent world. 
Russia is more and more assertive, there is a probably prolonged military crisis in Ukraine, the po-
litical and military situation is escalating in Europe’s southern and south-eastern neighbourhood 
with imminent impact on Europe’s societies. The spectre of Grexit reflects the fact that there are 
fundamental flaws in the Euro project as far as its long-term sustainability is concerned which ne-
cessitates further political and economic policy reforms at EU level. Brexit on the other-hand (al-
though the UK’s case is admittedly extreme) is a clear indication of popular disenchantment from 
the idea European integration. The above factors indeed hinder coordinated actions to counter the 
ever-stronger popular sentiment and well-articulated political agendas that question the useful-
ness of European integration and sometimes even the basic European values. European institu-
tions and member states suffer to focus on and face these challenges including the rising anti-Eu-
ropean and in some cases anti-democratic tendencies that will pose significant risks to European 
integration in the medium-term.
A new geopolitical order is on the rise. Pax Americana has started to give way to a new world 
order whose defining features are very unpredictable but which most probably be a more un-
stable one than the one we live in today due to the major rearrangement of the global equilibri-
um following the rise of new powers, and with a potentially significant level of hostile competi-
tion between the key actors. inside the EU major new geopolitical dynamics are gathering im-
portance which includes a quasi-dominant role of Germany, a weakening France, a Uk drift-
ing away and in general a more and more heterogeneous and multiple-speed EU with institu-
tions still in the process of self-redefinition. European economies and societies under pressure 
will probably be more susceptible to anti-EU sentiment and propaganda. 
Based on the above premises, it seems obvious that the EU needs a way more unified 
diplomatic approach to global political developments and clear political stance on the fi-
nal boundaries of the Union; a stronger capacity to exercise hard power; European army; 
a stronger and more unified internal security policy; a more effective immigration policy 
and policies to make integration successful; an institutional and political setup and an eco-
nomic policy framework that guarantees the long-term survival of the common currency, 
including a separate Eurozone budget; a new budgetary arrangement, a budget with a new 
approach that reflects this policy overhaul including the phasing out of controversial poli-
cies such as cAp and a fundamental reform of the cohesion policy and introducing a reve-
nue that creates ownership in the society in relation to the European project; a true energy 
union and a co-ordinated energy-diplomacy and finally a stronger sense of ownership and 
self-identification of European citizens with the European project in order to make these re-
forms achievable with the necessary level of public support. 
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The German and the French economy ministers made a plea in june 2015 to establish a 
significantly more united Eurozone,1 and thereby a two-speed Europe. They claim: “we have 
to launch an economic and social union by agreeing on a new, staged process of convergence 
that would involve not only structural reforms (labour, business environment) and institu-
tional reforms (functioning of economic governance) but also social and tax convergence 
where necessary (consistent, though not necessarily equal, minimum wages, and a harmo-
nised corporate tax).” They also advocate a separate Eurozone budget to underpin the rein-
forced EU-core. “A eurozone-level budget … is a feature of any functioning monetary uni on. 
This budget would have its own revenues (for instance a common financial transaction tax, 
as well as a small portion of a harmonised corporate tax) and would provide for borrowing 
on that basis.” They focus mainly on the Eurozone and economic issues but they add rightly: 
“strengthening the euro is not only about the Eurozone. it cannot be isolated from a broader 
rethinking of the EU. These changes would create a Eurozone architecture that increasingly 
relies on common institutions. to make its institutions work, however, Europe will need to 
address its democratic deficit as well as its executive one. A better functioning Europe also 
requires a stronger sense of community. institutional legitimacy arises from closer links be-
tween citizens. hence, we need to strengthen our affectio societatis.” They clearly state at the 
end of their paper: “A stronger Eurozone should be the core of a deepened EU.”
The authors of this paper share this view. This paper however will not restrain its themat-
ic focus only on economic issues, it rather elaborates on several other aspects that seem de-
cisive for the establishment of a better-functioning Union that reflects global realities and 
challenges on the one hand and meets expectations of its citizens. to this end, the following 
aspects of EU policy will be given as assessment: defence and military policy; foreign and se-
curity policy, immigration policy (Europe and the world), moreover economic and budget-
ary issues including the common Agricultural policy and cohesion policy and the question 
of European identity and the European demos. 
1. thE EU itsElF
1.1. Economic policy and budget-related issues 
more than five years have passed since the outbreak of the financial crisis. many institution-
al changes and reforms have been undertaken since then. The crisis brought to light serious 
shortcomings in the existing framework of European financial market supervision too, so 
the EU was forced to act in this area. prudential supervision at EU level has been reinforced 
to help coordinate the work of national regulators and ensure EU-level rules are applied con-
sistently [European systemic risk Board (EsrB), European Banking Authority (EBA), Eu-
1 A joint article by Emmanuel macron and sigmar Gabriel,
 see: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/03/europe-france-germany-eu-eurozone-future-
integrate
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ropean insurance and occupational pensions (EiopA), European securities and markets 
Authority (EsmA), European system of Financial supervision (EsFs)].
The present crisis has shown quite well that the integrity of the internal market may be 
threatened by the fragmentation of the financial sector. The EU banking market came under 
extreme pressure, several major financial institutions went bankrupt. Therefore in 2012 the 
European commission launched Banking Union, which started to operate in 2014. 
The financial crisis soon turned into a sovereign debt crisis threatening the monetary union as 
a whole. responding to the debt crisis two temporary funds, the European Financial stabilisa-
tion mechanism (EFsm) and the European Financial stability Facility (EFsF) with a total lend-
ing capacity of E500 billion were set up as an immediate response. European stability mechanism 
(Esm) was created in 2012 as a long term solution for immediate crisis management. 
The stability and Growth pact (sGp) the legal and procedural guarantor of sound pub-
lic finances, proved insufficient to sustain sound public finances in EU and Eurozone mem-
ber states. Therefore the so-called Fiscal compact was adopted which reinforces the rules of 
sGp although its practical functioning leaves a lot to desire. it sets out an automatic proce-
dure for imposing penalties in case of breaches of either the 3% deficit or the 60% debt rules. 
The ‘six-pack’, the ‘two-pack’ have also brought additional improvements to the framework 
for fiscal policies in the EmU. European semester is a yearly cycle of economic policy co-
ordination. At the end of the cycle, the EU addresses specific reform recommendations to 
each country.
despite all these reforms and progress the Eurozone is still largely unfinished. Therefore 
the so-called five presidents’ report published in june 2015 sets out an action plan for the 
major reforms in EU economic governance. it builds on the previous report “towards a 
Genuine Economic and monetary Union”2 and on the commission’s Blueprint for a deep 
and Genuine EmU3 of 2012. The five presidents – European commission president jean-
claude juncker, together with the president of the European council, donald tusk, the 
president of the Eurogroup, jeroen dijsselbloem, the president of the European central 
Bank, mario draghi, and the president of the European parliament, martin schulz lay down 
a plan for strengthening Europe’s Economic and monetary Union.4 
The report sets out three different stages to complete the European economic union:
1. 1 july 2015 – 30 june 2017: deepening by doing: boosting competitiveness and structur-
al convergence, completing the Financial Union, achieving and maintaining responsible 
fiscal policies at national and euro area level, and enhancing democratic accountability.
2. After 2017: completing EmU: more far-reaching actions will be launched to make the 
convergence process more binding.
3. Final stage: at the latest by 2025, including a level of political union.
2 van rompuy, herman (2012): towards a Genuine Economic and monetary Union http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf 
3 European commission (2012): Blueprint for a deep and Genuine EmU http://ec.europa.eu/archives/
commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2012/11/pdf/blueprint_en.pdf 
4 juncker, jean-claude (2015): completing Europe’s Economic and monetary Union. http://ec.europa.eu/
priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-presidents-report_en.pdf 
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in spring 2017 the commission will prepare a “white paper” in order to ensure the tran-
sition between stage one and stage two. member states have to accept increasingly joint de-
cision-making on their national budgets and economic policies. With the below four areas 
of action, according to the intent of the report, the EmU will complete at the latest by 2025: 
– a genuine Economic Union,
– a Financial Union,
– a Fiscal Union,
– a political Union.
to make a genuine Economic Union a reality, a reinforced macroeconomic imbalance 
procedure, stronger coordination of economic policies and also a stronger focus on employ-
ment and social performance are needed immediately. new institutions are required also, 
such as an independent competitiveness Authority. 
The cornerstone of the Financial Union is completing the Banking Union. Banking Uni-
on has four major elements: single rulebook for the European financial market; single su-
pervisory mechanism (ssm); single resolution mechanism (srm), supported by a sin-
gle resolution Fund (srF) and a fiscal backstop; deposit Guarantee schemes (dGs). cur-
rently only the single rulebook, ssm and srm are operating. srF and dGs have to be set 
up by 2017. to achieve a real financial union a capital markets union is required also by 
the end of the first stage. 
Fiscal Union requires sound and coordinated budgetary policies in member states. to en-
sure this a European Fiscal Board is inevitable, which would coordinate and complement al-
ready existing national fiscal councils. in stage 2, a common macroeconomic stabilisation 
function should be set up to better deal with shocks that cannot be managed at the national 
level alone. A euro area treasury is also advocated by the report. 
on the way to a political union strengthening democratic accountability, new insti-
tutions and higher level of legitimacy are required. therefore greater parliamentary in-
volvement and control and strengthening the role of the Eurogroup are recommended 
by the leaders of the EU. 
The report is clearly a major step towards a more federal economic union, although 
not as ambitious as some might have expected. it is the view of the authors of this paper 
that more ambitious policy actions are necessary. The economic crisis brought to light 
the structural problem of the Eurozone and the European integration. A monetary Union 
without an economic and political union is not sustainable. in order to guarantee the lon-
gevity of the Eurozone, the following measures and reforms seem inevitable: making Eu-
rozone exit legally possible, moreover creating exit procedures; establishment of a Euro-
zone budget of 3-5% of Eurozone Gdp to use as macroeconomic buffer as suggested by 
the recent Franco-German contribution. 
1.1.1. General budgetary issues
one has to bear in mind that the EU budget (as of today) is not only small but is not at all de-
signed to tackle macroeconomic shocks and crisis in a monetary union which needs a puffer 
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for shocks and a stable transfer pool which can be deployed in a prompt manner (this may 
even include pan-Eurozone social benefit schemes as well. The introduction of a Europe-
an tax by unionizing a certain percentage point of national vAt rates and thereby finishing 
with member state membership fee should be envisaged. The annual EU budget is €142bn 
(2014 figures) – a large sum in absolute terms, but only about 1% of the Gdp generated by 
EU economies every year. traditionally own resources usually represent about 12% (10,14% 
in 2013) and the vAt-base related own resource about 10% (9,38% in 2013) of the total 
budget. At present European budget is financed mostly by member states through a mem-
bership or rather ownership fee. citizens are completely detached from the act of contrib-
uting to the common EU budget. “no representation without taxation”. A budget-neutral 
(both for citizens and member states) solution is to be found. moreover in order to strong-
ly safeguard national budgetary discipline a Eurozone finance minister with defined veto 
rights over national budgets is to be nominated therefore allowing for Eurobond issuance. 
The Esm should be transformed into a proper European monetary Fund and the Banking 
Union should be established in its entirety.
most of the above measures are already envisaged in EU initiatives such as “towards a 
genuine economic and monetary union” which claims that a true economic union should 
improve the economic situation, thereby stimulating growth, reducing the threats to social 
peace and narrowing the economic gap within the EU. The crisis has revealed the high level 
of interdependence and spill-overs between euro area countries, therefore a deeply integrat-
ed economic policy framework is necessary, a monetary union alone cannot function prop-
erly with 28 different fiscal policies. 
1.1.2. Cohesion Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy
Whether or not a separate Eurozone budget is established (there is a very high probability 
of this happening at some point) the EU28 budget needs an overhaul to mirror global real-
ities, true European needs and expectations of the societies of EU member states. A radical 
decrease in the common agricultural policy spending coupled with a major overhaul of the 
cohesion policy on one side and much bigger budgetary emphasis on key areas such as de-
fence, immigration and European-identity related issues are needed. 
From the 2014-2020 financial framework the EU devotes 376bn € to cohesion policy. co-
hesion policy’s relevance for worse-off member states is evident, nevertheless the efficien-
cy and usefulness of regional policy funds is a controversial issue. The level of dead-weight 
in EU-fund use is very high; moreover they often contribute to corruptive practices. There-
fore a radical rationalization of the cohesion policy spending and raising more possibilities 
for rapid suspension in case of misuse, fraud or corruption is inevitable in order to guaran-
tee the meaningful application of this policy. 
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the European Union spends 373 billion EUr5 on the common Agricultural policy 
between 2014–2020. Although it indicates an 11% decrease compared to the previous 
EU programming period, cAp still has one of the highest shares – 38,9% – in the to-
tal EU budget until 2020. Approximately three quarters of the cAp budget are devot-
ed to market related expenditures and direct payments, while one quarter to rural deve-
lopment. cAp budget has decreased in relative terms in the EU budget since the mid-
1980s. the 2013 mFF decision earmarks a historic turning point in this process: the 
cAp budget in absolute figures decreased for the first time in EU’s history. the 2008 
financial crisis as well as the current economic and social crisis in the EU could have 
triggered a much more fundamental change in the structure and financing of the cAp. 
since 1962 cAp has aimed at contributing to the economic, environmental and territo-
rial development of the EU. however, in its current form it fails to address these chal-
lenges appropriately. therefore a radical reshaping of the structure and financing of the 
cAp seems to be inevitable. A fundamental reform of the cAp should take into account 
the following considerations in line with the increasing deprivation of EU population, 
increasing gap between EU-15 and EU-13 member states as well as citizens’ expecta-
tions towards the best use of EU money.
the social dimension of the cAp shall be strengthened by allocating more resources 
to food security programmes for the most deprived. in the EU, there are approximate-
ly 3.8 billion EUr earmarked for the Fund for the European Aid for the most deprived 
for the 2014–2020 period.6 this amount is less than 1% of the cAp budget. rural de-
velopment pillar of the cAp shall be integrated into the ’smart, inclusive growth’ head-
ing of the current mFF. most of these resources – at least a dedicated envelope – shall 
be spent on fostering rural entrepreneurship, smE development, agricultural innova-
tion and social economy.7 
in line with the recent efforts that have been taken to eliminate the unbalanced and 
unjust distribution of cAp money among member states and farmers,8 the equal treat-
ment of farmers throughout the EU shall be ensured from 2020.9 A drastic cut in the 
amount of direct payments shall be exercised: the greening component10 shall be deleted. 
The amount spent on green measures shall be used to generate public goods via more in-
vestment in social economy and building high-speed it infrastructure in all rural territo-
ries of Europe. nevertheless, the complete abolition or renationalisation of the cAp is un-
desirable as it could lead to a ’support competition’ among mss, causing an acceleration 
of job losses in rural areas as well as a decline in agricultural production in many member 
states with increasing food prices. 
5 commitment appropriations, 2011 prices; source: European commission
6 FEAd is not financed by the cAp envelope. 
7 Unlike the current situation when most of the funding is spent on rural infrastructure and village renewal.
8 for example, capping of the amount cAp payments per farmer
9 Expressed in the amount of payments per hectare.
10 30% of the direct payments
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1.1.3. Energy union and energy diplomacy
The EU imports 53% of its energy at a cost of around EUr 400 billion, which makes it 
the largest energy importer in the world. six member states depend on a single external 
supplier for their entire gas imports and therefore remain extremely vulnerable to supply 
shocks. 94% of transport relies on oil products, 90% of which is imported. collectively the 
EU spends over EUr 120 billion per year – directly or indirectly – on energy subsidies, often 
not justified. over EUr 1 trillion need to be invested into the energy sector in EU by 2020 
alone. Wholesale electricity prices for European countries are 30% higher than in the Us, 
while wholesale gas prices are still more than twice as high as in the Us.11 At the same time 
EU companies have a share of 40% of all patents for renewable technologies. here the chal-
lenge is to retain Europe’s leading role in global investment in renewable energy.
The European energy system faces an ever more pressing need to ensure secure, sustaina-
ble, affordable energy for European citizens and industry. Excessive dependence on a limit-
ed number of supply sources, especially for natural gas, leaves countries vulnerable to supply 
disruptions. This dependence on fossil fuels should be significantly decreased.
The proposed European Energy Union12 should ensure this. The Energy Union is based 
on the three long-established objectives of EU energy policy: security of supply, sustainabil-
ity and competitiveness. to reach these objectives the Energy Union focuses on five mutual-
ly supportive dimensions: Energy security, solidarity and trust; the internal energy market; 
energy efficiency as a contribution to the moderation of energy demand; decarbonisation of 
the economy; and research, innovation and competitiveness.
in order to make sure that energy related actions at European, regional, national and local 
level all contribute to the Energy Union’s objectives in a coherent way, a reliable, transparent 
and integrated governance system for the Energy Union will be launched. The governance 
should secure the attainment of the objectives of the Energy Union, notably the implemen-
tation of the internal energy market and the delivery of the 2030 Framework for climate and 
Energy. it should also provide long-term investor certainty.
dependency on often unreliable and sometimes hostile energy suppliers is clearly a geopo-
litical risk for the EU, therefore – besides energy market reforms – the EU should strength-
en its diplomatic coordination on energy issues otherwise it remains vulnerable to geopoliti-
cal blackmail. The energy union will be an important step in the right direction but much re-
mains to be done especially on the international aspects of the EU’s energy policy.
 
1.2. European identity 
An increasing majority of the EU citizens feel that the EU is dealing mostly with non-sa-
lient issues that are far from their everyday problems. The challenges facing the European 
11 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/En/tXt/html/?uri=cElEX:52015dc0080&from=En
12 commUnicAtion From thE commission: A Framework strategy for a resilient Energy Union with 
a Forward-looking climate change policy / com/2015/080 final /
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Union internally and globally, however, would require a more unified Europe. nevertheless, 
the latest developments of European integration indicate that the EU lacks many of its citi-
zens’ support. The necessity of bottom-up processes and the activation of European citizens 
have never been so timely as today. Thus, the greatest challenge today is to fulfil Europe’s 
longstanding wish: to be loved by European citizens. jean-jacques rousseau once said, that 
“love of the country is a hundred times more passionate than what you feel for your lover....” 
such a deep emotional attachment to the common Europe as the one described by rous-
seau is unimaginable in the EU at the moment. some level of positive attachment, howev-
er, should be developed if we do not want to forget about our common achievements and 
let the Eurosceptic, anti-EU sentiments prevail. This new European identity with emotion-
al content, however, should not be developed in place of any national or other (regional, lo-
cal) attachments but parallel , strongly connected to them. it should be a new, additional 
ele ment, a kind of strong “glue” in the multiple structure of individuals’ identity-net. to be 
loved by European citizens is not only the dearest wish but also a prerequisite for the future 
existence of the project.
identity-building is not a static but a dynamic process: it is a continuous self-definition. 
Foremost what we, hungarians, Germans, slovaks, French and italians think about Europe 
and our European identity is a reflection of what others think about us, or how others de-
fine us. All this takes place in the cultural sphere. it is only through cultural interaction that 
we can generate positive messages out of our diversity and at the same time find some ele-
ments of our commonality.
if we look around in Europe, we find an extremely heterogeneous picture. on the one 
hand, we all know that the irish and catalan culture – both the high and the popular – are 
more different than similar, but on the other hand we would all agree that shakespeare, 
 Beethoven, picasso, mozart, U2 or the rubik cube belong to our common European herit-
age. We have a thin layer in our cultural identity where we are all different, but we also have 
one where we share common values like humanism, the rule of law, democracy and human 
dignity. These latter elements constitute our “Europeanness”. most of us take them for grant-
ed and do not think of them at all in our everyday life. only if we happen to travel outside 
Europe do we start to appreciate them much more. These elements of our Europeanness are, 
however, not suitable for making Europe look sexy, lovable and full of emotional content. 
We should not forget, however, that the European identity is an identity of a construct-
ed nature.13 European integration started as an elite-driven project in the 1950s. Although 
it gained widespread support among the European public later, the role of the social and 
political elites in developing and running integration has remained significant until today. 
 European elites initiated the gradual establishment of European identity in the 1970s and 
since then the European community has made great efforts to establish the legal and polit-
ical framework, a common cultural policy as well as the symbols for the sake of a common 
identity. The declaration on European identity in 1973, the tindemans report in 1976 and 
13 on constructivism in identity formation see hobsbawm, Eric & ranger , terence (1983): Invention of Tradition. 
cambridge University press
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the Adonnino report in 1984 were all signs of an increased interest on the side of the Ec to 
establish a direct link between the individuals and the community, though it was not un-
til the beginning of the 1990s when the concept was involved in the founding treaties of the 
Union. The maastricht treaty introduced the concept of “citizenship of the Union” in 1991. 
Article 8 declares that “Every person holding the nationality of a member state shall be a cit-
izen of the Union”. Although this Article declares that citizens have both rights and duties, 
the rights declared by the treaty were very limited compared to the national citizenship con-
cepts. Article 128 of the maastricht treaty furthermore states that “The community shall 
contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while respecting their na-
tional and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to 
the fore.” The Union’s ambition to support the establishment of a common identity can be 
seen in subsequent legal documents. The entire second chapter of the Amsterdam treaty is 
dedicated to the “Union and its citizens”. The charter of Fundamental rights, declared in 
nice in 2000 represented another major step in establishing a direct link between the Uni-
on and its citizens, though it did not become legally binding until the lisbon treaty entered 
into force in 2009. nevertheless, the lisbon treaty did not incorporate the charter into the 
text, but made it legally binding by declaring that it has the same legal value as the treaties. 
Beyond the structural elements, the European Union strived to create the symbolic ele-
ments of the common identity. The blue flag with the golden stars “representing the uni-
on of the peoples of Europe”; the anthem, Beethoven’s 9th symphony; “Europe day” on the 
9th may; and the common currency, the Euro; all symbolise a sense of belonging to the EU.
consequently, since the 1970s, the European leaders have made great efforts to establish 
the legal and political framework, as well as the symbols (the flag, the anthem, the com-
mon currency, ‘Europe day’) for the sake of a common identity. As a result of this Europe 
has become an element of the collective attachments within the multiple structures of EU 
citizens’ identities. These endeavours, however, have merely led to the construction of EU 
identities of a civic nature. 
The Eurobarometer surveys regularly measure the EU citizens’ national and European 
identifications. on the basis of the last twenty years’ survey results, it can be said that the EU 
citizens have in general incorporated the “European dimension” into the multiple structures 
of their collective identities. With the exception of some short periods of time (spring 1987 
and spring 1990), the number of EU citizens who felt to some extent that they are EU citi-
zens, too, outnumbered the number of those who felt being only citizens of their nations.14 
it should be, moreover, emphasized that the trend has not been significantly changed due to 
14 on the multiple character of European identity see risse, Thomas: neofunctionalism, European identity, and 
the puzzles of European integration. journal of European public policy 12 (2): 291–309., 2005; salazar, jose 
miguel: social identity and national identity. in Worchel, s., morlaes j.F., paez, d., deschampy, j.c.: social 
identity. sAGE, publications, london, 1998; konrád György: A sokemeletes tudat. Európai szemle, vii. évf, 
3. szám, 1997.
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the negative effects of the economic and financial crisis either; almost six out of ten Europe-
ans feel to some extent a European citizens as opposed to four who do not.15 
in the same vein, when evaluating the existence of the civic pole in the European Union, 
the level of trust in the European and national institutions could be measured.
With regard to the last ten years’ data, the trust in EU institutions, i.e. in the European par-
liament and the European commission was in general higher than in their national coun-
ter-parts. in each surveyed period, the number of people who trusted the EU institutions 
outnumbered those that distrusted them. With regard to the European parliament, the ab-
solute majority of the surveyed people answered that they trust the Ep. The opposite could 
be concluded on the trust in national institutions, with the exception of the year 2002, in all 
of the surveyed period, an absolute majority of the EU citizens distrusted their national par-
liaments and their national governments. Apparently, the trust level in the European insti-
tutions was generally higher than in national institutions, which is a sign that European citi-
zens became parts of a bigger, supra-national political community.16 
The attitude of European citizens toward the European Union, however, has changed sig-
nificantly in the last five years. While with the exception of the year 2003, until the autumn 
2009, more people trusted the EU in general as opposed to those that distrusted it; from the 
spring 2010 on those who did not trust the Union outnumbered the people who trusted the 
EU. moreover, since then, in each surveyed period the majority of European citizens have 
answered that they do not trust the Union, which is a clear sign of the loss of credibility in 
the supranational political community.17 
trust can be regained, when European governance works effectively, its institutions are 
credible and when the Union is capable to provide answers to the most salient issues in Eu-
rope; those that affect the life of EU citizens.
But all this would probably not be sufficient either. The common European identity should 
be built not just on institutions and the legal system (civic identity) but also on culture.18
Who has felt close to Europe so far? Who has been part of the European project? politi-
cians, intellectuals, academics and civil servants. ordinary citizens, who are the first and 
foremost building bricks of Europe have not been looked upon as the core component and 
participant of the European project, but as some kind of a target group that has, from time to 
time, needed to be communicated to. What have not been created yet are the positive emo-
tions attached to Europe. Emotions like love, pride or happiness.
Europe does not know how to do this. There are numerous arguments why people do not 
and cannot understand Europe. Because Brussels is too far. Because the nature of the insti-
tutional system is very different from member states democracies. Because the EU does not 
15 Eurobarometer 17, 26, 27, 30, 31, 33, 37, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 73, 
76, 77, 80.
16 Eurobarometer 57-80.
17 Eurobarometer 57-80.
18 koller Boglárka: The fading civic identity of EU nationals. With a special focus on the East-central Europeans. 
in Attila ágh, lászló vass (eds.): European Futures. The perspectives of the new member states in the new Euro-
pe. Budapest college of communication.
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deal with bread and butter issues, such as maternity leave or unemployment benefit. But 
what can people understand? What can they identify themselves with? This is one of the 
greatest challenges of Europe.
in this respect, the human side of the common European project should be focused on. 
peop le are much more interested in people than in complicated institutional structures, boring 
processes and legal documents. Europeans are interested in Europeans. how they live, what 
they like and dislike, what they eat, wear, say or debate… and in particular in an everyday con-
text. moreover, they are also interested in the leading personalities of EU politics. just imagine: 
it would be particularly interesting to read about the commission president’s daily routine, 
his vice president’s summer holidays or stories in the Brussels’ buildings. A little gossip, some 
chatting, personalized stories would do Europe good. The medium through which this can be 
put into practice is culture. not only high culture but also the various means of popular cul-
ture. Additionally, the newly invented channels of social media and influential “story-makers” 
like bloggers, commentators and reporters, play crucial roles in the process of imagination.19 
here, special attention should be given to young people – as they are the key to the future and 
they are also the people whose identity can be most affected.
2. EUropE And thE World
2.1. EU foreign and security policy
The European Union is a unique institution, in which member states voluntarily gave up 
national sovereignty in many areas to carry out common policies and governance. We have 
to emphasise that it is not a super-state to substitute sovereign states and mss are not losing 
their sovereignty but sharing or pooling it. The EU cannot be viewed as a federation, an in-
tergovernmental or international organisation; it is a different, sui generis institution. This 
duality of intergovernmental and supranational natures has influenced the process of in-
tegration since the beginning. since the signing of the maastricht treaty cFsp has always 
been characterised by intergovernmentalism, the decision-making of common Foreign and 
security policy and common security and defence policy are still dominated by the mem-
ber states, common decisions are taken unanimously.
As these are new common policies of the EU the realisation of a real common Foreign and 
security policy and a real common security and defence policy belongs to the hardest goals 
to be achieved. These are the most difficult fields to be unified and realised in a fully coherent 
way. The latest crisis situations (in Ukraine and in the southern mediterranean areas) showed 
that the EU is still not a real global player and without effective tools it has only a lower level of 
influence on the situation, which creates new security challenges and threats.
Following the unsuccessful initiatives (Epc, Edc) of the post-war period it was obvious 
that the traditional diplomacy and foreign relations will stay in the member states’ compe-
19 Anderson, Benedict (1991): Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
revised ed., verso. Anderson, p. 6.
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tence in order to protect one of the most important parts of their sovereignty. however, with 
the creation of the EEc, and the shift from foreign relations towards economic issues, the 
Ec, as a major factor in the world economy, started to exercise an ever greater influence on 
its environment. As it is a normative or soft power,20 when signing agreements, building for-
eign relations and executing its development policy the EU laid much stress (with a more or 
less success) upon the representation and dissemination of its shared values and the protec-
tion of universal human rights. 
At the creation of the EEc, there was no hint at common foreign policy in the treaties. 
The customs union and the common market, however, resulted in an increasingly signifi-
cant network of foreign relationships. The Ec developed into a giant of world economy, 
and parallel to this wished to have a political role in international relations as well. This 
was hindered by the lack of a real common foreign policy. With the process of the Euro-
pean integration the necessity to establish the framework of cooperation in foreign poli-
cy became obvious.
Following the establishment of the common Foreign and security policy of the Europe-
an Union by the maastricht treaty on the basis of the European political cooperation this 
policy has started to develop rapidly. Although the successive modifications of the trea-
ties of the EU have created new positions and institutions (hr, or the EEAs) until now 
the EU is not really a global player due to the different foreign policy interests and view-
points of the mss, and for the EU it is still hard to speak in one coherent voice. The aim of 
the cFsp is to make the EU a global player of one voice, thus playing a role of greater in-
fluence in international relations. The general rule of unanimity in the field of csFp makes 
the EU slower and ineffective.
nowadays the external relations network of the EU can be described as the continuous in-
terplay and development of at least four fields (1. trade policy, 2. development and aid policy, 
3. the process of enlargement and the European neighbourhood policy, 4. the csFp/csdp).
in our days the initial sentence of the European security strategy (2003) is not appropri-
ate any more: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free”. Although the re-
view process of the security strategy and the European neighbourhood policy have been 
introduced and the hr has a clear mandate to do it, but the crisis in the EU’s Eastern and 
southern neighbourhoods shows that not only the security strategy, but also the necessary 
foreign policy tools of the EU must be rethought as well in order to act rapidly, to use a tru-
ly comprehensive approach and to protect the shared values of the EU. Facing new challeng-
es in an ever and increasingly changing security environment it is obvious that the EU needs 
a new security strategy in order to implement its foreign action tools comprehensively and 
increase the international credibility of the EU as a global and coherent actor.
20 nye, joseph s: soft power: The means to success in World politics . new york: public Affairs, 2004; ian 
manners: „normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?,” journal of common market studies. 40, no. 
2, 2002, pp. 235–58.
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As the new president of the Ec, jean-claude juncker stated in his program the high rep-
resentative should “act like a true European minister of Foreign Affairs”21 and thus the Euro-
pean External Action service should play the role of the European ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs (with the need of a better division between foreign policy and security/defence policy 
and integrating more communitarian elements (such as Enp) in the activities of the EEAs). 
A true European minister of Foreign Affairs would mean the strengthening of the use of the 
‘commissioner hat’ of this double hatted position (which has been started recently during 
the juncker commission). parallel to the development of cFsp the role of the European par-
liament, the only directly elected institution of the EU to scrutinize the EU’s foreign policy, 
should be strengthened (in the field of defence matters). 
certainly the whole EU is not ready to take part in the progress towards a deeper integra-
tion in the field of foreign and security policy, thus by promoting enhanced cooperation in 
the field of cFsp/csdp the differences in the European Union may further increase. 
2.2. Defence policy and the EU army
The Ukrainian crisis, the violent russian foreign and security policy pointed out that the Eu-
ropean Union needs hard power to externally authenticate its foreign policy and show se-
riousness about defending its values. recently the president of the European commission, 
jean-claude junker argued for the creation of / for creating a European army to face rus-
sia and other new threats.22 it is not the first time that a russian threat has led to calls for a 
European Army. in 1952, under the threat of the korean War and the soviet military pre-
ponderance, there was a suggestion to establish the European defence community (Edc), 
in order to create a joint military force under European control and command.23 Unfortu-
nately, the idea of  the European political community (Epc) was refused by the French na-
tional Assembly in 1954. The vision of joint European Forces was shelved by the primacy of 
national sovereignty, representation of national interests. German chancellor konrad Ade-
nauer was right when he said in december 1952 that there was no common defence policy 
without a common foreign policy.24
today, however, the EU has the common foreign and security policy and the common securi-
ty and defence policy. discussing the defence agenda in december 2013, the EU summit has 
called for greater responsibility for the defence budget and the development of the neces-
sary military capabilities.
21 „my priorities.” As commission president, i will set myself five priorities. http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities
22 jean-claude juncker calls for the EU Army. The Guardian, 8 march 2015 http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/mar/08/jean-claude-juncker-calls-for-eu-army-european-commission-miltary accessed at 10 
march 2015
23 http://www.britannica.com/topic/European-defense-community accessed at 19 july 2015
24 julian lindley- French: The north Atlantic treaty organization. The Enduring Alliance. routledge Global 
institutions, london and new york, 2007. p. 26.
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The European defence capabilities have been gradually reduced over the years.25 1 million 
450 thousand soldiers served in the EU member countries in 2013, 500 thousand less than in 
2006. This number is equal to the force of the United states, and one and a half times higher 
than the size of the russian armed forces. At the same time, the EU countries spent only 190 
billion euro (12% of total world spending) for the military, 1% less than the previous year. 
From 2006 to 2013 the European defence spending declined by 15% (€ 32 billion), and was re-
duced to only 1.45% of the total GDP. The world military expenditure in 2013 totalled 1.747 
billion $, around 2.4% of World Gdp. however, china (188 billion Us $) and russia (88 bil-
lion Us $) continuously increase the military budget. 80% of the European defence spending 
allocated by the “big three” countries (France, Germany, United kingdom), although each of 
them is reducing its defence budget. The military spending declined fell in most defence ar-
eas except few indicators (eg. science & technology). 59 thousand soldiers which make up 
4% of the total armed forces took part in peacekeeping operations in 2013. Active engage-
ment of the EU in crisis areas can be seen by the newly launched missions (EUcAp sahel 
of mali 2014, EUAm Ukraine, EUmAm rcA 2015) in 2014–2015. Although the EU offi-
cially has 485 thousand deployable and 110 thousand deployable and sustainable troops, the 
European forces capability to fight modern conventional warfare raises serious doubts. in 
the Wales nAto summit most of the European countries promised to increase the defence 
budget but only one country (Estonia) spends 2% of Gdp on defence in 2015.26
on the road to developing the csdp it was an important decision to create the Europe-
an defence Agency (2005) which coordinates the military capability development, research 
and technology and the European defence industry as well. in order to treat the unexpect-
ed conflicts the EU established the EU Battle Group concept, which became operational in 
2007. outside of the EU structure many international forms have been created to encour-
age the cooperation but none of them includes all member states. The EU has military head-
quarters, land, air and naval forces, which can be used as a rapid reaction force if political 
decisions are taken. The European corps (Eurocorps) is not just a command hQs in stras-
bourg (Fr) but it has assigned land force, too. The corps headquarters in munster (GEr) 
and szcezin (pol) are also operationally prepared and gained experience in the isAF oper-
ation and nAto reaction Force exercises. it would be no problem to subordinate 60 thou-
sand strong helsinki headline Forces to them if the EU council decides about it. The Euro-
pean Gendarmerie Force (vicenza, itl) was also tested in the Balkans and Afghanistan and 
can be used as an experienced military police force. The European Air transport command 
(EAtc) located in Eindhoven (nl) carries out airlift and refuelling tasks for the member 
states. Although the European maritime Force (EmF) is not a constant component, it is 
25 defence data 2013. European defence Agency. http://issuu.com/europeandefenceagency/docs/eda_defence_
data_2013_web/1?e=4763412/12106343 accessed at 10 April 2015
26 denitsa ragnova, ian kearns: The Wales pledge revisited: A preliminary Analysis of 2015 Budget decitions in 
nAto member states. European leadership network, policy Brief, February 2015 
 http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2015/02/20/04389e1d/Eln%20nAto%20
Budgets%20Brief.pdf accessed at 21 march 2015
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ready for deployment within 5 days. Therefore the EU has a peacetime military command 
structure and force, which could be the basis for a common European military force. 
The EU treaty (Article 42) states27 that the csdp shall include the progressive framing 
of the common defence policy which can lead to a common defence, when the European 
council so decides unanimously. it is not expected that all member states quickly accept this 
idea but the permanent structured cooperation in defence (pEscod) can be used to start 
stimulating the process.28 however, to carry out the EU Army concept it would be neces-
sary to replace the British - French tandem used to be a locomotive in the past to build the 
csdp to the Weimar triangle. The current Eurosceptic Uk cannot be the leader of the sin-
gle European Army plan because it does not believe in the idea. 
once the russian threat already mobilised the European decision-makers. in 1999, af-
ter the kosovo crisis the European council agreed that the Union should have its own in-
dependent crisis management policy supported by strong and credible military force. At 
that time the goal was to create military responsiveness to international crises outside the 
EU. today the requirement is to have military forces able to conduct large-scale conven-
tional and hybrid warfare including protection of the territorial integrity of the member 
countries, if necessary.
The European parliament took a big step forward when developed and adopted the syn-
chronized Armed Forces Europe (sAFE) concept in February 2009.29 The sAFE idea aims to 
create joint civilian and military structures and forces under the EU leadership on a volun-
tary basis like the euro zone or the schengen area were created. The plan would create a/the 
defence ministers council and introduce a free service based European soldier status law. 
sAFE would be operated on joint training, tactics and procedures approved by the partici-
pating member states. 
Although nothing was done in the past to implement the concept but the current russian 
threat can help to dust off the politically already approved idea. recently several multina-
tional security solutions increased the trust towards the sAFE vision. in 2014 a dutch bri-
gade was subordinated to the German rapid response Forces hQs in peace time.30 other 
nations (poland, Austria) are ready to join the new model, which is in harmony with the nA-
to ‘framework nation’ concept.
however, the progress in creating a joint European military Army depends not only on 
the vision but also requires patience, openness and continuous consultation, particularly 
27 http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-5-
general-provisions-on-the-unions-external-action-and-specific-provisions/chapter-2-specific-provisions-
on-the-common-foreign-and-security-policy/section-2-provisions-on-the-common-security-and-defence-
policy/129-article-42.html accessed at 19 july 2015
28 more Union in European defence. report of a cEps task Force, February 2015. centre for European policy 
studies, Brussels, http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/tFonEuropeandefence.pdf accessed at 19 july 2015
29 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/4689736/Blueprint-for-EU-army-to-be-agreed.html 
accessed at 10 April 2015. The idea of „synchronized Armed Forces Europe” (sAFE) was initiated by the 
former European parliament’s president, hans-Gert poettering and the EU proposals were drafted by the 
former German mEp, karl von Wogau. 
30 http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58798/print 2014/11/05 accessed at 10 April 2015
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with nAto. perhaps, the European Force concept is not very popular today, it encounters 
suspicious, hostile and distasteful views and opinions. Even our American Ally does not like 
it. But the EU commission president is right: Europe should review its defence policy and 
institutions and to start building the new European Army gradually with a group of like–
minded states. Fortunately, the European council discusses the European defence issues in 
december 2015 again when decisions must be taken. now it is time to act.
3. immiGrAtion policy
The immigration policy of the European Union still has to solve the eternal paradox of the 
free movement and security. immigration is a wide definition which includes legal means 
from entry, exercising rights, through stay − including work, study and family reunifica-
tion − to return. recently, illegal migration has been in focus in connection with immigra-
tion policy. As the Frontex31 published in 2014, detections of illegal border-crossing reached 
a new record, with more than 280,000 detections. The unprecedented number of migrants 
crossing illegally the external borders has roots in the fights in syria, which has resulted in 
the worst refugee crisis since the second World War. indeed, most of the detections at the 
borders concerned migrants from syria, who later applied for asylum within the EU. This 
“record” has several implications for border-control authorities and EU internal security.32
in addition to the conflicts and humanitarian crises in the world, the current migration− 
the mass influx of kosovars, the migration crisis in the Mediterranean i.e. mass smuggling of 
refugees from libya to the European Union − has urged the EU to take strategic decisions 
and immediate measures to deal with the situation.
it is shocking that a record number of migrants will drown in the mediterranean this year 
if the current death rate remains unchecked, since ten times as many migrants lost their lives 
during the first three months of 2015 as during the same period in 2014.33 Generally, this 
year’s data show that the record will be broken. since the beginning of the year some 153,000 
migrants have been detected at Europe’s external borders. This represents a 149% increase 
compared to the same period in 2014 when 61,500 migrants entered Europe.34
3.1. European Agenda on Migration
As Elisabeth collett pointed out the complexity of the problem why successive five-year 
plans, that have been the centrepiece of the Union’s migration strategy since 1999 are 
no longer up to the challenge. Those elements are the absence of a coherent pre-existing 
working methodology to respond to disasters; absence of European leadership and coor-
31 European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the External Borders of the member 
states of the European Union.
32 Frontex, Annual risk Analysis 2015, http://frontex.europa.eu/publications/
33 http://www.euractive.com/sections/development-policy/record-num
34 http://frontex.europa.eu/news/monthly-analysis-of-migratory-trends-may-2015-f02aln
BUdA – kollEr – kovács – mArján –molnár – szEnEs – szUhAi • EUropEAn policy ovErhAUl – A sEctorAl AssEssmEnt
79
ne
mz
etk
öz
i k
ite
kin
tés
 •
dination between immigration and refugee protection and the conflicts of policy goals: 
paradox of the free movement and security.35 in a reorganisation of the European com-
mission late in 2014, the home Affairs portfolio was renamed and restructured: the new 
directorate-General for migration and home Affairs (dG homE) reflects the higher pri-
ority being accorded to the topic.36 in the sense of a better-functioning Union, for the first 
time, better management of migration is an explicit priority of the European commission, 
as presented in the political guidelines of president juncker: A new start for Europe. mi-
gration is a cross-cutting issue, involving different policy areas and different actors, both 
inside and outside the EU. The new structure and working methods of the European com-
mission are the first steps toward responding to the challenges and of migration in a tru-
ly comprehensive way.37 
From the institutional legitimacy aspect, it would be the best time to consider the imple-
mentation of the idea of the appointment of special representatives on migration for the Ex-
ternal Action service.38
on 20 April 2015, at the joint Foreign and home Affairs council meeting, dimitris 
Avramopoulos, migration, home Affairs and citizenship commissioner presented a ten-
point plan of immediate actions to be taken in response to the crisis situation in the medi-
terranean. The ten-point action plan on migration aimed at strengthening the existing tools 
including the Frontex joint operations, the EUropol, EAso and EUrojUst, resettlement 
program, return program and immigration officers network.39 Although, the action plan 
addressed important measures, some member states criticized the rescue operations as they 
deem them as an encouraging factor for migrants. This also confirms the fact that there is no 
consensus among member states in this policy rea.
The European commission stressed that migration needs to be better managed in all its 
aspects. Through the European Agenda on migration,40 the EU aims at providing its mem-
ber states with approrpriate tools to act so. The Agenda published on 13 may 2015, outlined 
short, medium and long term priorities and provided for a new, comprehensive approach 
based on mutual trust and solidarity among EU member states and institutions. The docu-
ment includes details on measures which have been included in the ten-point action plan. it 
foresees an EU-wide resettlement scheme to offer 20,000 places. This scheme will cover all 
member states, with distribution criteria such as Gdp, size of population, unemployment 
rate and past numbers of asylum seekers and of resettled refugees, and will take account of 
the efforts already taken on a voluntary basis by member states. The EU budget will provide 
35 collett, E. (2013), Facing 2020: developing a new European agenda for immigration and asylum policy. mpi 
policy Brief series, issue no. 1, p. 1.
36 collett, E. (2015), The development of EU policy on immigration and asylum. mpi policy Brief series, issue 
no. 8, p. 2.
37 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ip-15-4545_en.htm
38 http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/eu-commissioner-migration
39 http://www.europeansources.info/showdoc?id=1203414
40 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf
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dedicated funding of an extra EUr 50 million in 2015/2016 to support this scheme. Work-
ing in partnership with third countries to tackle migration upstream includes regional de-
velopment and protection programmes as well as the migration will become a specific com-
ponent of ongoing common security and defence policy (csdp) missions already under-
taken in countries like niger and mali, which will be strengthened in border management.
According to the Agenda, more will be done to help deal with the immediate challenge 
faced by member states in the frontline of migrant arrivals. The commission will mobi-
lise an additional EUr 60 million in emergency funding, including to support for the re-
ception and capacity to provide healthcare to migrants in the member states under par-
ticular pressure. reinforcing the existing tools, European migration liaison officers will be 
seconded in EU delegations in key third countries, in close cooperation with the immi-
gration liaison officers network.
regarding the use of existing tools, it should be noted that a total of 252,003 third-coun-
try nationals were subject to an obligation to leave the EU in 2014 as a consequence of an 
administrative or judicial decision, which was a 12% increase compared to 2013. in 2014, 
there were 161,309 third-country nationals effectively returned to countries outside the 
EU, which was broadly similar to the numbers returned in 2013.41 it shows that the effec-
tiveness of decisions has deficit.
As outlined by president juncker in his political Guidelines, a robust fight against irregular 
migration, traffickers and smugglers, and securing Europe’s external borders must be paired 
with a strong common asylum policy as well as a new European policy on legal migration. 
clearly, this requires an enhanced coherence between different policy sectors, such as deve-
lopment cooperation, trade, employment, foreign and home affairs policies.
Though, the European Agenda on migration has ambitious plans, François crépeau, the 
special rapporteur on the human rights of migrants has recently pointed out that the ability 
of migrants to reach European soil despite a huge investment in securing international bor-
ders shows that sealing them is impossible, and only serves to empower human traffickers 
in the mediterranean. “if Europe insists on focusing most of its resources on securitization, 
it will fail to defeat smuggling rings. The European Union must recognize that irregular mig-
ration is a result of policies prohibiting immigration. such policies only serve to open a new 
and lucrative market for smuggling rings, which could not exist without this prohibition.”42
3.1.1. The European Council meeting
The conclusions of the European council meeting emphasized that Europe needs a bal-
anced and geographically comprehensive approach to migration, based on solidarity and re-
sponsibility.43 EU leaders agreed to distribute asylum seekers without binding quotas. 
41 Frontex, Annual risk Analysis 2015, http://frontex.europa.eu/publications/
42  http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=51163#.vyBps0bdvB8
43 European commission, conclusions − 25 and 26 june 2015, EUco 22/15.
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The European council focuses on three key dimensions: relocation/resettlement, return/
readmission/reintegration and cooperation with countries of origin and transit. According-
ly, the European council agreed to help 60,000 people: the temporary and exceptional re-
location over two years from the frontline member states italy and Greece to other mem-
ber states of 40.000 persons in clear need of international protection. Further on, member 
states will participate in the resettling of 20,000 displaced persons from conflict regions, in 
clear need of international protection. 
At the same time, the EU is at war with the smugglers who endanger the lives of migrants. 
on 22 june the council decided to launch the EUnAvFor mEd mission.
Besides the mediterranean, the migratory pressure of the Western Balkan route that leads 
to hungary was also in the focus at the meeting. The Frontex confirmed that the land route 
towards hungary constitutes the main transit route for migrants who entered the EU from 
Greece and Bulgaria.44 The European council acknowledged the extreme burden on hunga-
ry and Bulgaria. Therefore, these two countries will not participate in the relocation and re-
settlement measures. As donald tusk stated “since the beginning of the year, a third of asy-
lum seekers have been registered in hungary, which is more than in italy”. 
3.1.2. Budgetary and capacity demands
more resources at EU and national levels are needed to achieve real solidarity and a better 
sharing of responsibility between member states. it is a fact, that member states in frontline 
need more official capacity. to deal effectively with the challenges posed by the large num-
ber of arrivals in lesvos and other Greek islands, Unhcr is calling for urgent reinforce-
ment of personnel and resources of all the state services and civil society organisations deal-
ing with the reception of refugees.45
For the years 2014–2020, the overall home Affairs budget amounts to EUr 9.26 bil-
lion. the largest part of these resources consists of two big home Affairs Funds and the 
remainder (EUr 2.36 billion) is reserved for the funding of the home Affairs Agencies. 
With an overall budget of EUr 6.9 billion, the Asylum, migration and integration Fund 
(AmiF) and the internal security Fund (isF) will finance actions supporting EU home 
Affairs policies in the period 2014–2020 and through these actions and national pro-
grammes build a more open and secure Europe.46 With a budget allocation of EUr 96.8 
billion for the 2014–2020 period, EU external cooperation assistance, and in particular 
development cooperation, plays an important role in tackling global issues like poverty, 
insecurity, inequality and unemployment which are among the main root causes of ir-
regular and forced migration.47
44 http://frontex.europa.eu/news/monthly-analysis-of-migratory-trends-may-2015-f02aln
45 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=51113#.vyBsyEbdvB8
46 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/index_en.htm
47 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf
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3.1.3. Geopolitics and the Source Countries
in wider geopolitical context, two issues clearly stand out: the conflict in syria and the con-
tinued volatility in north African countries, notably libya, where migrants often depart 
from in their attempt to cross the mediterranean sea. The large number of displaced syrians 
in the middle East and north Africa suggests that syria will likely remain the top country of 
origin for irregular migrants and asylum seekers in the EU for some time to come.48 As Ban 
ki-moon has noted, the situations in syria, iraq, Gaza, south sudan, the central African 
republic, Ukraine and elsewhere demonstrate the changing nature and complexity of con-
temporary conflicts – repeated cycles of turmoil, exacerbating factors such as extreme pov-
erty, weak institutions or terrorism.49 preventing the instability of countries, with the view 
on development and aid operations, would help prevent the mass refugee movement, which 
is one of the “symptoms” of weak or failing states. The threats by failing states were already 
recognized in the European security strategy of 2003, which sounded among regional prob-
lems that “conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportu-
nities for organised crime.” That is why it is important to understand the logic of refugees’ 
decisions instead of forcing people into mechanisms that do not respond to their needs as 
François crépeau stated. Beyond this, cooperation with third countries is of critical impor-
tance in the fight against smugglers and traffickers anyway. The elimination of root causes of 
irregular and forced displacement in third countries needs political solutions.
48 Frontex, Annual risk Analysis 2015, http://frontex.europa.eu/publications/ p. 6.
49 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=48531#.vyBxyUbdvB8
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